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Contractual savings institutions - pension funds and life insur-
ance companies - are growing in several developing countries.
Their contribution in the 1  980s to the impressive performance of
emerging  stock markets has been li,nited. But the increasing
emphasis on financial liberalization and development of the
private sector suggests that their role and impact will increase
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Contractual savings institutions - pension funds  can - countries. And they have played only a
and life insurance companies - have long been  limited part in stimulating the growth of emerg-
important institutions in several developing  ing securities markets, even in countries such as
countries. But, with notable exceptions, they  Chile, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore, where
have been weak and underdeveloped.  Some of  contractual savings institutions have accumu-
this is attributable to low levels of income in  lated substantial long-term financial resources.
developing countries and some of it to the
negative impact of repressive regulations and the  *  Investment regulations must aim at ensuring
existence of pay-as-you-go social security  the safety and profitability of contractual sav-
systems.  ings. Encouraging investment prudence and
developing effective supervision should be basic
Vittas briefly reviews the size of contractual  objectives of public policy.
savings institutions in selected developed and
developing countries and assesses their role in  *  Contractual savings institutions can have a
the development of the financial sector - great impact on securities 8uarkets.  They can
especially in the development of securities  completely transform the functioning of securi-
markets. He stresses five points:  ties markets, facilitate the privatization process,
promote the dispersion of corporate ownership,
* The  structure of a country's  financial system  and improve corporate efficiency.
depends greatly on the organization of the
country's  pension system.  Pension funds and life insurance companies
are growing in several developing countries.
* Contractual savings do not increase the rate  Their contribution to the performance of emerg-
of saving but shift the composition of total  ing stock markets has been limited because
savings toward long-term financial assets.  investment regulations have favored government
bonds. Their potential impact on equity markets
* The role of contractual savings institutions  has remained largely unrealized, but the growing
in securities markets reflects historical traditions  emphasis on financial liberalization and develop-
and differences in regulation. Despite their great  ment of the private sector suggest that their role
potential, they are important players in the equity  and impact will increase substantially.
markets of only a few - mostly Anglo-Ameri-
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This paper has been prepared  for Inclusion in a book on The World's
Emerging  Stock Markets, edited by Antoine Van Agtmael.Introduction
Contractual savings institutions, i.e. insurance companies  and pension funds, have
long been important institutions in several developed  countries.  However, with some
notable exceptions, they have been  weak and underdeveloped  in most developing
countries. To a large extent, this can be explained by the lower level of income of the
latter.  But to a significant degree, the weakness of contractual savings institutions can
also be explained by the adverse  impact of repressive  regulations, the use of contractual
savings for financing the budget at below market rates, and by the existence of pay-as-
you-go social security systems that have undermined  the potential role that life insurance
companies  and pension funds can play in different countries.
Contractual savings institutions involve long-term contracts that may span up to
sixty years or more.  For example, pension schemes  may involve forty years of active
participation as contributing workers and twenty years of passive  participation as retired
beneficiaries. Furthermore,  term and endowment life insurance policies normally last for
ten years, often for as long as thirty years, while whole life policies cover the remaining
life of insured policyholders.
1Because  they cover such a long span and are often based on compulsory and/or
poorly defined contracts, they raise many complex regulatory issues that parallel, but are
more difficult to resolve than, those affecting commercial  banks. These include issues of
prudential regulation covering authorization criteria and solvency margins. product and
price regulation, and investor protection.  Governments  have a crucial role to play in
establishing  a regulatory framework that promotes stability, efficiency and fairness and
ensures  that contractual savings institutions fulfill their contracts and deliver the promised
benefits to their participants'.
The purpose  of this paper is not to address  the numerous  economic and regulatory
issues raised by contractual savings institutions but rather to review briefly their size in
selected developed  and developing countries and assess  their role in financial sector
development and especially  in the development of securities markets.  The paper focusses
on five points:
1.  The organization  of a country's pension system is a major determinant of the
structure of the financial syster-
2.  Contractual savings do not increase  the rate of saving but affect the
composition of total savings in favor of long-term financial assets.
The importance of these three objectives of financial regulation is discussed in Long
and Vittas (1991).
23.  The role of corntractual  savings institutions in securities markets reflects
historical traditions and differences in regulation. Despite their great
potential, they are important players in the equity markets of only a few,
mostly Anglo3-American  countries.  And they have played a very limited part
in stimulating the growtti of emerging securities markets, even in countries,
such as Singapore, Malaysia, Korea and Chile, where contractual savings
institutions have accumulated substantial long-term financial resources.
4.  Investment regulations must aim at ensuring the safety and profitability of
contractual savings.  Encouraging  investment prudence and developing
effective supervision should be basic objectives of public policy.
5.  Contractual savings institutions can have a large impact on securities
markets.  They have the potential to completely transform the functioning of
securities markets, facilitate the privatization process, promote the
dispersion of corporate ownership and enhance corporate efficiency.
I.  Organization  of Pension  Systems
The organization  of the pension  system is nowadays a major determinant of the
institutional structure of national financial systems. Traditional differences between bank-
based  and market-based  systems have been eroded. Retained  earnings have become  the
primary source of corporate finance in most developed  countries, while a growing trend
3towards universal banking and the internationalization  of financial systems have reduced
differences in practice.
In general,  countries with unfunded pay-as-you-go  social pension systems that pay
generous benefits have underdeveloped  contractual savings institutions, especially
company-based  pension funds.  Germany,  Austria, France,  Italy, and several other
Southern European  countries belong to this group.
In contrast, other countries, where social pension systems (funded or unfunded)
pay modest pensions have highly developed  occupational pension schemes. These
countries are characterized  by the accumulation of large financial savings in the form of
insurance and pension reserves. Most Anglo-American  countries and a few continental
European  countries (Denmark, the Netherlands,  Sweden,  and Switzerland) follow this
pattern 2.
In the developing world, the organization  of pension systems is also a major
distinguishing feature of financial structure.  The financial systems of most developing
countries are still dominated by commercial  banks, but countries with funded pension
systems of one form or another, such as Singapore.  Malaysia, Egypt, Cyprus, Chile and
Zimbabwe, also have large contractual savings sectors.  Other countries, such as Brazil,
Indonesia,  the Philippines,  Jordan and Turkey have funded pension schemes,  though their
2  It is worth noting that, unlike  the traditional distinction of banking  systems,  the dividing
line between  countries  with developed  and countries  with underdeveloped  contractual  savings
industries is no longer a simple one between continental European and Anglo-American
countries.
4size in relation to tota: financial assets is not very large.  In contrast, most Latin American
ard Eastern  European  countries have pay-as-you-go  pension systems that make no or little
contribution to the accumulation of financial savings.
Ill.  Impact on Saving and the Promotion  of Long-Term  Savings
There is a vast and inconclusive  literature on the impact of funded and unfunded
pension  systems on the rate of national saving.  Funded  systems that are young and lack
credibility may involve an increase  in overall saving because  they generate-compulsory
savings while consumers are less inclined to adjust their saving behavior with regard  to
their discretionary income.  But as systems mature and gain in credibility, the greater
efficiency of saving through contractual savings institutions may lead to changes  in
consumer behavior that may compensate,  and even overcompensate,  for the increased
availability of future pension incomes 3. Thus, contractual savings may have a positive
impact on the rate of saving in the short run, but this is likely to prove transitory and over
the long run their effect on overall saving may even be negative'.
Internationally, there is little correlation between pension  funding and saving ratios.
Singapore  and Switzerland, two countries with compulsory participation in funded
systems, have very high saving rates, but the United States, the United Kingdom  and
3  For a discussion of alternative views on this issue and a review of the literature, see
Aaron et al (1989).
4  The long-term impact of a transitory increase  in the rate of saving may of course be
very large, depending on whether the funds are invested wisely and set in train a virtuous
circle of high growth followed by high saving.
5Sweden, all countries with large funded systems, have some of the lowest saving rates.
Moreover, several countries with underdeveloped  contractual savings sectors, such as
Italy, Greece,  Portugal as well as Japan (during the high growth era), Koria  ,nd  China,
have high saving ratios 5.
While the quantitative impact of contractual savings on aggregate  saving is unclear,
their qualita.ive impact on the composition of naticial  savings is beyond dispute:
contractual savings cause a shift in favor of long-term financ,al savings.
Data on the total assets of life insurance  companies and pension funds in different
countries show that in 1987 contractual savings institutions mobilized resources  equal to
133% of GDP in Switzerland and 1  17% in the Netherlands. The corresponding ratios
were 105% in the United Kingdom  and 72%  in the United States.
Among developing countries, contractual savings institutions in Singapore  and
Malaysia controlled resources  equal to 78% and 48%  of GDP  in the same year.  Other
developing countries with relatively large contractual savings sectors include Egypt (45%),
Cyprus (30%), Chile (30%),  anid  Korea (18%).  Zimbabwe, Botswana, Jordan, the
Philippines,  and ko a lesser extent, India, Turkey, Indonesia  and Brazil  also have significant
contractual savings sectors.
5  A factor that affects saving behavior  seems  to be household  access  to credit facilities
(Vittas, 1991).
6The structure of the contractual savings sector differs considerably  from country to
country.  In developed  countries with large contractual savings industries, such as
Switzerland, the Netherlands,  the United Kingdom and the United States, the predominant
type are occupationally based pension funds.  In Germany  and other European  countries as
well as Japan, where contractual savings institutions are relatively weak, the predominant
type are life insurance companies.
There is also considerable  variation in structure among developing countries.  In
Chile, the dominant role is played by the AFPO  system based on personal pensiun plans, in
Korea by the life insurance  companies, in Egypt, the Philippines,  Jordan and Turkey by the
partially funded social security organizations,  in Cyprus, Indonesia  and Brazil by company
pension funds and in Zimbabwe, Botswana and India bv a combination of provident funds,
S7 company-based  pens-cn  schemes  and life insurance companies.
X The creation of funded pension schemes can generate substantial long-term
financial savings even in a relatively short period of time.  In countries where labor
incomes represent 50% of national income, a compulsory scheme covering 40% of the
labor force and imposing a 10% contribution rate would accumulate annually funds equal
to 2% of national income  If the nominal rate of return on fund balances is equal to the
nominal rate of growth of GNP,  and since in the early years of operation pension benefits
would be minimal, these pension schemes would accumulate resources  equal  to  10% of
°  AFP  stands  for Administradoras  de Fondos  de Pensiones,  the specialized  pension  fund
management  companies.
'  See Vittas and Skully (1991) for  a discussion of the operating characteristics and
merits and demerits of different types of contractual savings institutions.
7GI Or  over 5 years and 20% over 10 years. After the first 10 years, the pace of
accumulation will be affected by the growing volume of benefit payments. On the other
hand, expanded  coverage and an increase  in the share of labor income in total income will
tend to accelerate  tV-  pace of accumulation.
The experience  of Singapore, Malaysia  and, mors recently, Chile shows that once a
credible and well run system is put in place, it can accumulate  long-term resources  at a
very fast pace.  In Singapore,  the resources  of the Central Provident Fund rose from 28%
of GDP in 1976 to 73% in 1986, while in Malaysia  they grew from 18% of GDP  in 1980
to 41% in 1987 (Vittas and Skully 1991).  In Chile, the system of personal pension plans
that was introduced in 1981 expanded from a mere 1% of GDP in 1981 to 9% in 1985
and 26% in 1990 (Vittas and Iglesias 1991).
The growth of contractual savings depends on three factors:  the coverage of the
sector; the level of annual contributions; and the rate of investmant returns.  In Singapore
and Malaysia, the fast growth in the resources  of contractual savings institutions was
caused by an expansion in coverage, a rise in contribution rates and the growth in wages.
In Singapore,  the effective contribution rate amounts to 33% and in Malaysia  to  18%.  In
Egypt, a country with a funded social security system and a favorable demographic
structure, I  , effective contribution rate is 22%9.  In Chile. a major factor in the rapid
growth of the AFP system was the attair-ent  of very high real rates of return, averaging
9  The effective contribution rate takes account of the payments  made by employers  and
the government. In Egypt the nominal contribution rate is 26% -10% by the employee, 15%
by the employer and 1  % by the government.  Thus, contributions equal 26 out of a total
payroll cost of 1  16 or slightly over 22%.
813% per year in the 1  980s, while the contribution rate was only 10% (Vittas and Iglesias
1991).
In the United States, and especially  in the United Kingdom, contractual savings
experienced  a large expansion in the 1  9&Os  in relation to GDP  as a result of the larje  rise
of stockmarket prices.  In the United States, the assets of insurance  companies  and
pension funds grew from 43% of GDP in 1970 to 49% in 1980, and 67% in 1988.  !n the
United Kingdom, they rose from 45% in 1970 to 49% in 19F'o and 120% in 1988.  The
much faster rise in the-United Kingdom reflects the greater exposure  of contractual savings
to the equity market and the strongur performance  of life insurance policies.
IV.  Role in Securities Markets
The role of contractual savings institutions in the securities markets differs
considerably  from country to country, reflecting historical traditions and differences in
regulation.  In the United Kingdom, where fund managers  have developed  a so-called
equity cult since the 1.960s,  mainly in response  to the high rates of inflation, Dension
funds and life insurance  companies accounted in 1988 for 55% of corporate equities.  In
contrast, in the United States they held only 26% of corporate equities.  However,
American long-term institutional investors also held 56%  of corporate bonds.
The equity cult of UK fund managers  is also reflected in the composition of their
portfolios.  Pension  funds invested 67% of their assets in equities against 51  % for life
9insurance companies. In contrast  in the United States, life insurance companies invested
less than 10°%  of their assets in equities against over 44% for pension funds.
In European  countries, contractual savings institutions follow the pattern of
American life insurance  companies and place the largest part of their funds in government,
corporate and mortgage bonds and in long-term loans.  This is true of insurarice companies
and pension  funds in Switzerland, the Netherlands  and Germany. It is partly the result of
investment regulations and partly the result of a traditional emphasis  on conservative
investment policies.
A good example of this is provided by the AlgerrenQ  Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds  or
ABP, the pension fund for employees of the Dutch public sector.  This is one of the largest
individual pension funds in the world with nearly US$80 billion under management. Until
recently, ABP was not allowed to invest in overseas  assets and its investments in
domestic  equities and property were limited to 20% of assets.  However, 90% of ASP
assets are invested in bonds, loans and mortgages, with only 5% in equities and another
5%°  in property.  In 1988, ABF was allowed to invest up to 5% of its resources  in foreign
assets.  Its management  is aeeking an increase  in the overall limit on equity and property
investments to 30%, even though it has a long way to go to reach the current limit of
20%.
In Sweden, both the National Pension  Insurance  Fund  and life insurance companies
were traditionally required  to invest heavily in bonds issued by mortgage credit institutions.
In recent years, following the financial deregulation of the mid-1980s, insurance
10companies have been able to diversify into equities, but the public pension funds have
been prevented from investing in equities because  of concerns about the volatility of
equity prices and about indirect public ownership of industrial companies.
In Singapore  arnd  Malaysia, the national provident funds invest over 90% of their
funds in government securities that earn a slightly positive real rate of return.  Despite  the
enforced captivity of the resources  of the Central Provident Fund (CPF),  the government of
Singapore  has refrained from investing all the funds in local development projects but has
accumulated a substantial pool of foreign exchange  reserves. In 1989, foreign exchange
reserves  exceeded the total balances  of the CPF. The CPF  effectively operates  as a
compulsory national unit trust, investing in foreign assets on behalf of Singaporean
households.
In Malaysia  and Egypt, the funds of contractual savings institutions have been used
for development purposes. In Malaysia,  the successful implementation  of economic
growth policies has ensured  a modest real rate of return on the balances  of the Employees
Provident Fund, but in Egypt the resources  of the social security system have been placed
with the National Investment Bank, the investments of which have generally  suffered from
negative returns.
In Chile, the pension funds invest 80% of their resources  in debt instruments,
including state securities that account for 40% of total resources. Investments in
corporate equities are only 20% of total assets, mainly because  of the imposition of tight
investment restrictions.  Equity holdings accounted  for 10% of total assets in 1989.  The
11large increase  since then is due to the relaxation of investment rules in the late 1  980s and
the boom in stockmarket prices.
V.  Regulatory Framework and Investment Rules
In countries where contractual savings institutions are underdeveloped  and where
there are no long-term financial assets in which people can save for retirement purposes,
consumers accumulate wealth in real estate, precious  metals and foreign assets that are
likely to provide good hedges against inflation.  The promotion of contractual savings
creates an effective mechanism  for channeling  such savings through the local financial
system to finance an expansion in the suppiv of productive capital.  Efficient contractual
savings institutions can help enhance investment productivity, stem, and perhaps  even
reverse,  capital flight, and lower the real rate of interest.
However, the ability of contractual savings institutions to transform the functioning
of securities markets and enhance  corporate efficiency depends on the orientation and
effectiveness of the regulatory framework and especially the regulations that are imposed
on their investment portfolios.
The main objective of investment regulations  is to ensure  that insurance companies
and pension funds invest their assets prudently. The basic aim is to prevent undue
12concentration of investment risks in particular types of securities, industrial sectors or
individual companies. Investment regulations should place maximum limits on permissible
holdings and should not make use of minimum req irements that aim to direct investments
in particular securities or in favor of particular sectors.
It should be noted that detailed investment rules are not necessary  for ensuring the
safety of contractual savings.  In the United Kingdom, life insurers and pension funds are
not subject to detailed investment rules, but are expected to demonstrate that their assets,
prudently valued, meet the requirements  for technical reserves  and solvency margins. This
allows for greater freedom of investment and greater flexibility in matching a company's
assets with its obligations  arising from its particular business  mix.
For company-based  pension schemes,  investment rules are required to ensure  that
pension reserves are segregated  from  other funds of the sponsoring company and are
invested prudently.  The latter implies a limit on the amount of pension reserves  that can
be invested in the securities and property of the sponsoring  employer and the stipulation of
diversification requirements  similar to those applicable  on the technical reserves of
insurance companies.
If pension schemes  are funded by the creation of book reserves,  which are then
available  for self-financing by the sponsoring  company, prudential  controls should require
that such funds be reinsured  with acceptable reinsurers  to increase  the security of
benefits.  In Germany, companies  have the option to establish insured funds, operate self-
administered pension funds or create book reserves. If they choose the third option, they
13are required to reinsure  their pension  liabilities with  PSV, a pension insurance company,
which takes over the pension liabilities of insolvent firms and is funded by annual
assessments  on participating employers.
In Chile, the AFP system is subject to draconian  investment rules. These have been
motivated by the shallowness  and lack of credibility of the domestic financial markets.
Investment rules aim to limit the exposure of both individual pension funds and the whole
of the pension funds sector.  They are expressed  in different but complementary ways:  as
a fraction of the securities of each issuing company;  as a fraction of the resources  of each
pension plan;  as a fraction of the securities of each issuing company in total company
securities;  and as a fraction of the resources  of each plan in the total of all personal
pension plans 9.
The applied investment rules have caused some distortions in the market.  For
instance, large pension funds have produced lower returns in recent years because  they
have been unable to invest the same proportion of their funds in corporate equities with
good prospects as smaller pension funds.  For the larger pension funds the binding limit is
the fraction of the securities of each issuing company whereas for smaller funds it is the
fraction of their own resources'°.
I  The investment rules applied on Chilean pension funds are reviewed in Vittas and
Iglesias (1991).
'1  Available data show that in 1990 Provida and Santa Maria, the two  largest AFPs,
achieved real rates of return of 13.3% and 14.6% respectively against 18.7% for Planvital
and 18.2% for Cuprum (Habitat, 1991, p. 121).
14For pension fund managers  in developed  countries, who are generally free to set
their own investment guidelines,  the application of so many investment limits would
appear  excessively bureaucratic  and inefficient.  Limits that are based on the share of an
individual pension fund in the total value of all pension funds or in the share of liabilities of
an issuer in the total liabilities of all issuers of the same class of instruments may be
onerous in practice and difficult both to comply with and to verify.  Furtherriiore, there is a
risk that imposing excessively  strict investment limits may undermine  the concept of
private management  and may in effect represent  a government direction of funds through
the back door.
However, in the context of the experience  of developing countries, the absence  of
strong and transparent capital markets, the compulsory nature of the pension system and
the lack of familiarity of pension  members with capital market investments, the detailed
investment rules appear  justified, provided they are revised in a flexible and timely manner
to take account of the growing maturity of the system. An approach of gradual
liberalization  would give the oppcrtunity to pension  fund managers  to develop their skills
as professional  investment managers  and would also allow the capital markets to
modernize. Revisions  in the investment rules have been effected at regular intervals in
Chile, while it was clearly fortunate that AFPs were not allowed to invest in corporate
equities during the 1982-84 financial crisis.
A further issue that is difficult to resolve in developing countries regards the
authorization of investments in overseas  assets. A notable feature of UK regulatory
practice is that, following the abolition of exchange controls in 1979, institutional
15investors  enjoy  complete  freedom  to invest in foreign  assets. Insurance  companies  and
pension  funds  in most  other  developed  countries,  including  Canada,  Germany  and the
Netherlands,  are  still subject  to restrictive  regulations  on their  foreign  investments.
For  developing  countries,  allowing  institutional  investors  to invest freely  overseas
would allow a diversification  of country risk but it would also  institutionalize  capital  flight.
Furthermore,  it would deprive  the loc£;  markets  of the beneficial  effects of the increased
availability  of long-term  funds".  The  Chilean  experience  suggests  that institutional
investors  can be  an effective  force in stimulating  innovation,  improving  efficiency  and
inducing  desirable  fiscal,  legal  and regulatory  changes.
VI.  Impact  on Emerging  Securities  Markets
A traditional  argument  against  fully funded  social  security  systems  and private
pension  funds has been  the concern  that in the absence  of active securities  markets,
accumulated  funds  might be used  as captivo  sources  for funding  government  deficits.
Without  active and efficient  financial  markets,  private  pension  funds  would be unable  to
invest  wisely  and safely  their  accumulated  funds  even  if they were  not used  as captive
sources  of government  funding.
"  Available  data show that UK pension  funds invest 18% of their funds in overseas
securities  against 16% for Japanese  contractual  savings  institutions  and less  than 5% for
American  pension  funds. However,  for smaller  countries  complete  freedom  may result in
much  higher  proportions  of total funds invested  in overseas  assets.
16This argument was probably valid in the 1  960s and 1  970s when few developing
countries had well orgcnized securities markets.  But in the 1  980s the large growth of the
so-called emerging securities markets underscores  the potential for developing more
efficient contractual savings institutions" 2. Moreover, this argument overlooks the
dynamic interaction that would evolve between growing pension  funds and emerging
financial markets and thus underestimates  the contribution that contractual savings
institutions can make to the development of financial markets.
Nevertheless,  it is fair to say that very few, if any, emerging securities markets owe
their impressive performance  in the 1980s to the presence  or impact of contractual
savings institutions.  In most developing countries where such institutions have
accumulated substantial long-term resources, their investments have been mostly
channelled  towards fixed interest instruments. Even  in Chile, the pension funds have
accounted for a small fraction of corporate equities.  Of all the markets that are included in
the IFC database  of emerging securities markets, only those in Brazil, Indonesia  and
Zimbabwe have probably benefitted from the presence  of contractual'savings institutions
as equity investors.
But there can be little doubt that as investment rules are relaxed, contractual
savings institutions will be allowed to become  important players in the securities markets
of a large number of countries.  By providing an effective demand for marketable  securities
and a mechanism  for professional  fund management,  they will encourage  the further
12  The phenomenal  growth of emerging securities markets in the 1  980s is reviewed in
IFC (1991).
17development of markets and will stimulate financial innovation and efficiency.  Institutional
investors will exert pressures  for better accounting and auditing standards as well as for
more meaningful and timely disclosure of information to investors.  They will also
encourage  improved broking and trading arrangements  and will help establish more
efficient and reliable clearing and settlement facilities.  In sum, institutional investors will
stimulate the modernization  of securities markets.
Contractual savings institutions can also play an important part in facilitating the
privatization programs of many countries.  In Chile, the pension funds participated
successfully in the privatization of state-owned companies. In fact, their equities in
privatized companies  still represented  95% of their total equity portfolios in 1990.  Funded
pension systems can play a crucial part in the development of the private sector in Eastern
European  countries.
Contractual savings institutions can also promote a greater dispersion of corporate
ownership and contribute to the so-called  democratizatidn of capital.  However, the use of
pension funds as instruments of ownership dispersion may be frustrated by the
unwillingness of closely-held  companies  to suffer a dilution of control.  In Chile, the results
of investment rules that have allowed greater equity holdings in companies with less
concentrated ownership have been rather poor.
Contractual savings institutions may stimulate greater corporate efficiency by
monitoring the performance  of the companies  in which they invest and exerting some
control over the behavior of corporate management. This will depend on their developing
18the necessary  mechanisms  for collecting information about corporate performance  and the
necessary  expertise for analyzing  the prospects of individual companies  and sectors.
VIl.  Concluding Remarks
Contractual savings institutions are growing in several developing  countries.  Their
potential impact on the development  of securities markets is still largely unrealized,
although the implications of financial liberalization  and the increasing  emphasis  on private
sector development suggest that their role and impact will increase  substantially in the
future.
Well regulated contractual savings institutions, essentially pension funds and life
insurance companies,  are likely to play a crucial part in mobilizing long-term financial
resources, developing equity and all types of bond markets (government, corporate and
mortgage bonds), and filling the gap in the supply of term finance that exists in most
developing countries.  They can play an important part in facilitating the privatization of
state-owned companies and in promoting greater dispersion of corporate ownership.
Their success will depend on the existence of a robust and effective regulatory
framework that emphasizes  stability, efficiency and fairness and does not use such
institutions as tax collectors and captive sources of government funding.
19REFERENCE
Aaron, Henry J., Barry P. Bosworth and Gary Burtless (1989):  Can America Afford to
Grow Old? - Paying  for Social Security, The Brookings  Institution, Washington D.C.
Habitat (1991): Diez Anos del Sistema'de AFP, Habitat, Santiago.
IFC (1991):  Emerging  Stock Markets Factbook, International Finance  Corporation, 1991.
Long, Millard and Dimitri Vittas  '1991):  Financial Regulation  - Changing  the Rules  of the
Game, World Bank, PRE  Working Papers,  WPS  803, November.
Vittas, Dimitri (1990):  Economic  and Regulatory  Issues of Contractual Savings
Institutions, World Bank, CECFP,  mimeo, October.
Vittas, Dimitri and Augusto Iglesias (1991): The Rationale  and Performance  of Personal
Pension  Plans  in Chile, World Bank, CECFP,  mimeo, September.
Vittas,  Dimitri and Michael Skully (1991): Overview of Contractual Savings Institutions,
World Bank, PRE  Working Papers,  WPS 605, March.
20Policy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS  842 Capital  Flows  to South  Asia  and  lshrat  Husain  January  1992  S. King-Watson
ASEAN  Countries:  Trends,  Kwang  W.  Jun  31047
Determinants,  and  Policy  Implications
WPS843 How  Financial  Markets  Affect  Lonn-  Ejaz  Ghani  January  1992  A. Nokhostin
Run  Growth:  A  Cross-Country  Study  34150
WPS844 Heterogeneity,  Distribution,  and  Ravi  Kanbur  January  1992  WDR  Office
Cooperation  in  Common  Property  31393
Resource  Management
WPS845 Inflation  Stabilization  in Turkey:  Luc  Everaert  January  1992  B. Mondestin
An  Application  of  the  RMSM-X  Model  36071
WPS846 Incorporating  Cost  and  Cost-  Larry  Forgy  January  1992  0. Nadora
Effectiveness  Analysis  into the  Diana  M.  Measham  31091
Development  of  Safe  Motherhood  Anne  G. Tinker
Programs
WPS847 Coping  whh  the  Legacies  of  Silvia  B.  Sagari  January  1992  M.  Guirbo
Subsicized  Mortgage  Credit  in  Loic  Chiquier  35015
Hungary
WPS848 How  EC  1992  and  Reforms  of  the  Merlinda  D. lngco  February  1992  P.  Kokila
Common  Agricultural  Policy  Would  Donald  0. Mitchell  33716
Affect  Developing  Countries'  Grain  Trade
WPS849 Financial  Structures  and  Economic  Ross  Levine  February  1992  W. Pitayatonakarn
Development  37666
WPS850 Fiscal  Adjustment  and  the  Real  Kazi  M.  Matin  February  1992  D. Ballantyne
Exchange  Rate:  The  Case  of  Bangladesh  38004
WPS851 Sources  of World  Bank  Estimates  Eduard  Bos  February  1992  0. Nadora
of Current  Mortality  Rates  My  T.  Vu  31091
Patience  W.  Stephens
WPS852 How  Health  Insurance  Affects  the  Joseph  Kutzin  February  1992  0. Nadora
Delivery  of Health  Care  in  Developing  Howard  Barnum  31091
Countries
WPS853 Policy  Uncertainty,  Information  Gerard  Caprio  February  1992  W. Pitayatonakarn
Asymmetries,  and  Financial  37664
Intermediation
WPS854 Is  There  a Case  for an  Optimal  Export  Takamasa  Akiyama  February  1992  G. liogon
Tax  on .lerennial  Crops?  33732
WPS855 Sovereign  Debt:  A Primer  Jonathan  Eaton  February  1992  S.  King-Watson
31047Pollcy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS856  Latin  American  Women's  Earnings  George  Psacharopoulos  February  1992  L. Longo
and Participation  in the Labor  Force  Zafiris  Tzannatos  39244
WPS857  The Life Insurance  Industry  in the  Kenneth  M. Wright  February  1992  W. Pitayatonakarn
United  States:  An Analysis  of Economic  37664
and Regulatory  Issues
WPS858  Contractual  Savings  and Emerging  Dimitri  Vittas  February  1992  W. Pitayatonakarn
Securities  Markets  37664
WPS859  Macroeconomic  Management  and  Ibrahim  A. Elbadawi  February  1992  V. Bartheimes
the Black  Market  for Foreign  Exchange  39175
in Sudan
WPS860  The Restrictiveness  of the Multi-  Refik  Erzan  February  1992  G. llogon
Fibre  Arrangement  on Eastern  Christopher  Holmes  33732
European  Trade